Turkey
and Europe: Two Trains on a Collision Course?
By intervening in
Lebanon, Europeans have made a far-reaching, risk-fraught,
and, at the same time, correct decision. The reason is
that the future of Europe’s security will be determined
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Europe,
whether it likes it or not, has taken on a new, strategic
role in the region. Should it fail, the price will be
high.
In view of the serious risks that Europe has assumed,
in full awareness of the consequences, it is of the utmost
importance that a European “Grand Strategy” for the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East be developed, so
that Europe can calmly and clearly define its interests.
In any serious variation of this Grand Strategy, Turkey
will need to play a central role – politically,
militarily, economically, and culturally.
Safeguarding Europe’s interests today means
establishing a strong link – indeed an unbreakable bond
– with Turkey as a cornerstone of regional security. So
it is astonishing that Europe is doing exactly the
opposite: firmly closing its eyes to the strategic
challenge posed by Turkey.
Successful modernization and democratization of Turkey
– with a strong civil society, the rule of law, and a
modern economy – will not only be hugely beneficial for
Turkey, but will also export stability and serve as a
model for transformation in the Islamic world. Above all,
the successful modernization of a large Muslim country
will make a decisive contribution to Europe’s security.
Since the days of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern
Turkey, the modernization of Turkey has relied on its
Western or European perspective. For the last 43 years,
this perspective has been largely defined by Turkey’s
interest in joining the European Union and by the EU’s
promise of accession. But at the very moment when even
slightest glance at the crisis-ridden region on Europe’s
eastern flank – Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Middle East
conflict, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, Islamic
terrorism, emigration, and threats to Europe’s energy
supplies – should make clear Turkey’s paramount
importance to European security, Europe is reveling in its
disinterest in the state of European-Turkish relations.
This autumn, the European Commission is scheduled to
issue a progress report on accession negotiations with
Turkey. A dangerous situation may well emerge, as this
report threatens to derail the whole process.
The key dispute is over Cyprus. Turkey has refused to
open its ports, airports, and roads to the Republic of
Cyprus, as it is obligated to do by the Ankara Protocol,
which set the terms of Turkey’s accession negotiations.
Turkey explains its refusal by the EU’s failure (as a
result of a veto by the Greek Cypriot government in
Nicosia) to fulfill its own promise to open up trade with
Northern Cyprus, which is under Turkish rule. The EU made
these promises at the Council of Europe in December 2003
and formally at the Council of Foreign Ministers in April
2004. But so far it has not fulfilled them. So it is
Ankara – and not the EU! – that has a legitimate point
here.
When the Ankara Protocol was agreed, the government of
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved
something that, until then, had been considered
impossible: he shattered the decades-old opposition of
Turkish Cypriots to a compromise between the two parts of
the divided island. Turkish Northern Cyprus accepted UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan’s plan (massively supported
by the EU) to resolve the long-standing conflict. But the
Greek South, goaded and inflamed by its government,
rejected it. It would be deeply unjust and outright
foolish if the EU Commission’s report holds Turkey
responsible for its refusal to make further concessions to
Greek Cyprus (now an EU member), while refusing to blame
the government in Nicosia, which is the real cause of the
blockage.
Some in the EU – mainly in France, Germany, and
Austria – seem smugly pleased by the prospect of a clash
on this issue, believing it will force Turkey to give up
its drive for membership. But this attitude is
irresponsible. The EU is about to commit a grave strategic
error by allowing its report this autumn to be guided by
the short-sighted domestic policy considerations of some
of its important member states.
And what perspective would Turkey have outside the EU?
Pan-Turkish illusions? A return to the Orient and to
Islam? None of these will work. But Turkey will not sit
idly on Europe’s doorstep. Europe’s attitude is
pushing Turkey towards forging alliances with its
traditional regional rivals, Russia and Iran. These three
powers, each of great importance to Europe, have been
rivals for many centuries. So an alliance between them
would seem a near impossibility. Yet Europe seems bent on
achieving the impossible, to the Continent’s detriment.
Within Turkey, opinion polls suggest that frustration
with Europe is intensifying, while Iran is viewed with
increasing favor. A sense of alienation towards the West
is spreading, and Turkey’s diplomatic relations with
Russia have reached a hitherto unknown intimacy.
Of course, there is vast domestic resistance to
Turkey’s accession to the EU. The final result of the
accession process is therefore an open question for both
sides. Admittedly, Turkey has a long way to go. But to
endanger this process here and now, in full awareness of
the possible costs, is an act of very costly stupidity on
the part of the Europeans – and stupidity is the worst
sin in politics. In European-Turkish relations, two trains
are racing headlong towards each other. Neither Turkey nor
Europe can afford the all-too-foreseeable crash.
Joschka Fischer was Germany's Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from
1998 to 2005. A leader of the Green Party for nearly 20
years, he is now a visiting professor at Princeton
University's Woodrow Wilson School.
Copyright:
Project Syndicate/Institute of Human Sciences, 2006.
www.project-syndicate.org
